| The
High Price Of Dealing With Cuba
John Turley-Ewart
National Post, Toronto, Canada
January 4, 2003
Castro takes Canadians for millions of dollars.
While tourist brochures tout Cuba as a vacation paradise
of sandy beaches, the Castro government has refused to pay millions
of dollars it owes to Canadian companies and Canadian taxpayers
have subsidized further millions in foreign aid that has done
little to alleviate the country's desperate poverty.
Denis Paradis, Canada's Secretary of State for Latin America,
headed to Havana in early November with a message for Fidel
Castro, Cuba's communist strongman: "Canadian companies
are committed to Cuba ....” He returned to Ottawa saying, "Small
and medium-sized Canadian companies have an especially important
role to play" in Cuba, and he crowed that he had "promoted
Canadian culture and values" throughout his stay.
Perhaps. But what he almost certainly did not do was promote
the best interests of the Cuban people or Canadian business.
While in Cuba, Paradis opened the Canadian Pavilion at
Havana's 20th annual international trade fair and at the same
time, lobbied to counter Cuba's desire to trade more with the
United States. Expanded Cuban-U.S. trade is a looming possibility,
now that pressure is building within the United States to end
the U.S. economic embargo that allows only for highly regulated
direct food sales to individual Cuban entities, as well as for
the sale of medical supplies, all of which must be paid for in
cash.
Behind that pressure are such well-funded lobby groups as Americans
for Humanitarian Trade with Cuba and the American Farm Bureau.
They believe that more trade with Castro will help Cubans and
fatten the wallets of U.S. farmers. Last September, both groups
were in Washington, arguing for an end to the embargo. A month
later, they were in Havana at a large trade fair for U.S. agricultural
companies, enviously eyeing the bonanza represented by the
US$100-million in annual agricultural products Cuba imports.
Many of these companies, along with Castro's government, hope
the U.S. treasury, like Canada's, will also open its vaults and
extend Cuba the loans it needs to pay for almost everything
it imports.
But if Canada's experience is anything to go by, that hope could
be hollow.
January, 1997, was supposed to mark the beginning of a
new era in Canana-Cuba relations. That is when both countries
signed an investment accord that Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's
Liberal government was promoting as a good thing for both
human rights and business. It has proven to be neither.
Taxpayers, along with small and medium-sized businesses in Canada,
have been burned by Castro ever since the Prime Minister and
ministers such as Paradis started promoting trade with the tropical
tyranny.
Mississauga-based Adecon Ship Management, for instance, provides
refinancing and administrative services to Cuban shipping companies.
The Cuban government currently owes it US$2.2-million, but is
ignoring a Canadian federal court order, delivered through
proper diplomatic channels, to pay up.
When an Adecon director went to Havana at Cuba's invitation
to negotiate a settlement, he was detained and his files
taken away when he refused to drop his Canadian court case against
the Cubans. In a communication marked "confidential," Jennifer
Irish, then chargé d'affaires for the Canadian Embassy
in Havana, said the "official Cuban reaction has been that
the documents are 'subversive to the Cuban economy' and are being
used as the basis for an investigation...." Yet the documents
merely show that Castro's government did in fact owe Adecon money
for services rendered. The company's director and papers
were released only when the Canadian government intervened. Adecon
is now tracking Cuban ships around the world and impounding them
in order to force payment.
Canada's Export Development Corporation has used the same strategy
for recovering Cuban loans, using taxpayers' money to provide
accounts receivable insurance for Canadian exporters. The EDC
had the ship MV Caribbean Queen, owned by Cuba, detained in Casablanca,
Morocco, in 2001 before it collected on a debt amounting to approximately
$500,000. It had another Cuban ship detained in a French port
until the Cuban government settled out of court. But these
are only small victories in a much larger battle for repayment
that EDC is losing.
While ministers in the Canadian government have been promoting
trade with Cuba, the EDC has been taking the opposite tack. In
September, Rod Giles, an EDC spokesman, said Cuba was no longer "an
active market" for the agency and it would "not be
responsible for us to promote business [in Cuba] considering
the current circumstances."
FirstKey Project Technologies, another Canadian firm, would
have saved itself a great deal of money had it known in advance
about the risks of doing business with Castro. It was one of
the first Canadian companies to go into Cuba and it lost
millions of dollars for its trouble when Castro eventually reneged
on deal he had struck with FirstKey over an electrical-power
generating project outside Havana.
The Cuban government has not spared small Canadian businesses,
either. According to sources familiar with Cuban business practices
in Canada, some maritime provision suppliers operating along
Canada's East Coast that have sold goods to Cuba's fishing fleet
have not been paid and are suffering as a result.
For large Canadian companies that do get paid by the Cubans,
such as Sherritt International and companies in the tourism business,
a nasty legal surprise may await them down the road. Under Castro's
rules, foreign companies employing Cubans must pay hard currency
to Cuba, not directly to those they employ. In turn, Castro's
bureaucrats pay the workers at going Cuban rates, but in Cuban
currency, worth a tiny fraction of what Castro puts in his tills.
Cuban exiles and others are already counting the days when they
can take Canadian companies to court and sue them in classaction
cases as accomplices in Castro's scheme to rob workers of their
rightful wages.
The Canadian taxpayer has also paid a high price for dealing
with Castro's communists. In the 2000-2001 fiscal year,
nearly US$22-million of Canadian public money went to cover Canadian
exports to Cuba that Castro could not or would not pay for. Canada
has also extended what amounts to a US$10-million line of credit
to Cuba to help it pay for Canadian agricultural imports. Castro
has failed to pay that back as well.
Castro need not stay awake at night worrying about repaying
Canadians. He knows our leadership's desire to do business
with Cuba is more about politics than trade. Thus, it is hardly
surprising that, according to some sources, Castro's government
told Paradis and his officials that if Canada wished to
counterbalance Cuba's desire to trade more with the United States,
Canada had better be prepared to extend Cuba more credit.
Canadian trade and aid to Cuba are part of Prime Minister Jean
Chrétien's policy of "constructive engagement," a
soft-power program touted as being a way to facilitate development
and a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. In April, 1998,
during an official visit to Cuba, Chrétien launched his
policy when he opened the new wing of the José Marti International
Airport in Havana, built using Canadian materials and expertise.
Unlike George W. Bush, the U.S. President, and most of his predecessors,
who believe there should be no negotiating with Cuba's communist
ruler, Mr. Chrétien used his 1998 visit to try to prove
otherwise, claiming to espouse the plight of four Cuban
human rights activists –Marta Roque, Vladimiro Roca, Felix
Bonne and Rene Gomez– unjustly imprisoned for calling
for greater freedom in Cuba. Yet when given a chance to speak
freely on Cuban television, Chrétien's concern for human
rights quickly evaporated.
Chrétien returned to Ottawa with a photo of himself
standing with Castro and managed to score points with the reflexively
anti-American Liberal and intellectual elite at home. The biggest
winner, though, was Castro. Because his Soviet subsidies had
vanished along with the end of the Cold War, Castro's grip on
Cuba's economy now depended upon European and Canadian credit,
private investment and, to a very large extent, tourism.
Moreover, the communist dictator's economic trials were further
eased by Chrétien's promises of more Canadian aid money
to prop up his government, more private investment –at
the behest of the Canadian government, no less– and a propaganda
victory over the United States. Castro told Cubans, who have
been hoping in vain for relief from his despotism, that Chrétien's
visit demonstrated how isolated the United States is in its opposition
to his government.
The fiction of Canada's "constructive engagement" fell
apart the following year, in 1999, when the four human rights
activists whose cause Chrétien was said to support were
sentenced to five years in Castro's Caribbean gulag. Our Prime
Minister was reportedly "irked." Meanwhile, most Canadians
continued to see Cuba through vacation brochures, with their
pleasant villas well out of sight of the poverty across the island.
Castro's flouting of Chrétien's "constructive engagement" policy
provoked platitudes and little else. Empty threats about no more
high-level ministerial visits between Canada and Cuba, and
no more provisions of computer technology for the Cuban justice
system, such as it is, were promised –but all turned out
to be meaningless. This year, the Canadian International Development
Agency has sent Castro's Cuba $8-million, much of it last fall
around the time of Paradis's trip to Havana. Since the Liberal
government restored Cuba's eligibility for aid in 1994,
CIDA has sent close to $65million to Cuba. At the top of
Canada's priorities for this money is the "modernization
of the [Cubas] state," yet there is no talk of using it
to promote "good governance," which is Chrétien's
muchtrumpeted foreign-aid policy aim for Africa.
In Cuba, people are prevented from exercising the basic freedoms
Canadians take for granted. Human Rights Watch, an international
organization dedicated to fostering respect for human rights
around the world, documented Castro's abuses in its detailed,
1999 study, Cuba's Repressive Machinery. It concludes that despite
signing many treaties, including the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, Cuba's legislation falls "far short of
compliance with these treaties and in many respects blatantly
violate their provisions." The message to Canadians
from HRW is unequivocal: "Ottawa has little to show for
its engagement with Havana and must now use its leverage to push
for reforms."
Yet Canada's leverage is mythic rather than real. Little has
changed since HRW's 1999 study. Cubans continue to live
in fear of the regime. Committees for the Defence of the
Revolution still operate, informing on anyone who loes not
conform or who has the temerity to suggest Cuba should be free.
Cubans are still jailed for opposing Castro's rule.
Last November, soon after minister Paradis returned
to Canada, Raul de la Nuez Ramirez, Cuba's External Trade Minister,
arrived
in Ottawa. On a sleepy Wednesday afternoon, Ramirez was escorted
finto the temple of Canadian democracy, the House of Commons
and, on cue, the Speaker recognized him, hailing him as "His
Excellency." MPs quickly rose to their feet, some shouting "hear,
hear," knowing the visitor was a member of a regime
the U.S. administration deplores and Cubans suffer in enforced
silence. Ramirez was then afforded an ovation –a testament
to Canada's official response to the oppression of the Cuban
people.
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