By Pat Cox, from Dublin* (Introduction by Tegê Muñoz)
Europe: e pluribus plus

For those who do not live in the EU, let us imagine a Union with a fresh constitution that reneges the its Judeo-Christian past; a Union with a single currency that not all its members share; a Union without inner boundaries except when one crosses the English channel; a Union with a tightly-bound foreign policy save for timely digressions on Irak, Cuba and the US. What is this? Mr. Cox is right: "We already have Europe , now we need Europeans."

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Arguably, Europe's twentieth century began on a bridge' in Sarajevo in August 1914 and ended ith the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Which pathway to take was already clear. It had been traced in the post-war vision of creative reconciliation of the new Europe 's founding fathers.

This year, 20041 the enlargement of the European Union to include the former Communist-dominated states of Central and Eastern Europe marks a victory for a certain idea of Europe, a victory for freedom, a victory for a Europe based on an acquis communautaire and not an acquis totalitaire. For the first time our old continent is unified not at the point of a sword nor from the barrel of an ideological or imperial gun but by the free will of free and sovereign peoples.

Our unity is around an idea of Europe and of the future. Ours is a unity in diversity. It aims not as in the United States of America at "e pluribus unum", from many, one, but at creating for tomorrow a Europe of united states through which we can create "e pluribus plus", from many, more.

This is an enabling Europe of added value not requiring that we be less of who we are to be European but, that by being European also, we can be more effectively who we are and wish to be, at home and on the wider global stage.

Economic beginnings
The early generation of European leaders was the beneficiary, as an elite, of a post-war permissive public consent. The shock of the war and its horrific and costly consequences produced a public willingness in the original founding six states to accept this new experiment because they had lived through the dreadful alternatives.

This was reinforced by the existence of a common external threat, in the form of the Soviet Union, accentuated by Europe 's cold war divisions expressed by the iron curtain. These truths belong to another era and are fading in the public memory with the passage of time and the generations.

When the innovative new European institutions were established the preferred path for the construction of Europe relied decidedly on economism and functionalism, by reIying on economic building bricks and the functional interdependence of what worked. The European Coal and Steel Community, with its supranational management of the former key resources for making war, consolidated the peace. After Messina it led quickly to the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European Economic Community to which was added a consecutive series of common policies —agricultural, social and regional. This was intensified with the Single Market project, the creation of the Structural Funds and Cohesion Policy and the eventual achievement of the Single Currency.

The Europe of values
The aim to make the European Union the most dynamic knowledge intensive society in the world by 20101 the Lisbon agenda, is a further step in the same direction. Economic success is a necessary condition for a successful social Europe but neither economic nor social progress is a sufficient condition for a polítical Europe.

Economism and functionalism alone are incapable of generating the kind of political engagement and consent necessary for Europe truly to be a Europe of citizens. The European Union has managed to europeanise many aspects of European policy without yet having europeanised our politics and our public opinion. Echoing the Conte di Cavour who observed after Italian independence "L'ltalia e fatta, occorre fare gli italiani", Bronislaw Geremek more recently remarked: " We have Europe , now we need Europeans."

In this context the step towards a constitutional Europe represents a decisive watershed. The Constitution lists the values on which the Union rests: respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. These values it asserts "are common to the member states in a society of pluralism, non discrimination, tolerance, justice and solidarity."

No Constitutional Treaty at the European level can eliminate the differentiated interpretations and appreciation of what these values mean in the given national, regional, ethnic, political, social and economic mosaics that constitute today's European Union. Yet the universality of these values and their policy expression through the promotion of solidarity, sustainability and cultural diversity reveals a common European cultural space.

This space intertwines the traditions, ideals, aspirations and experiences that bring us together in a context which is recognisably European. This space - the Europe of values - is an expression and a search for a deeper and more sustainable paradigm and narrative than economism and functionalism alone could provide. Put broadly, the values agenda is a search for an essentíal spiritual link, for a deeper meaning. It informs but does not displace the necessity for negotiated political consensus. It also invites the emergence of a European civil society with whose emotional intelligence and reasoning an basis for dialogue and political discourse can be created.

We recognise it in the feelings about whether there is one law for the small and one for the larger member states as regards the Stability and Growth Pact. We see it in the widespread popular reaction to the war in Iraq . We can delineate its contours in the emerging debate on Turkey in Europe . A more politically aware and engaged public opinion is good for Europe even if it challenges the prescriptions of Europe 's political elites.

Challenges to a liberal Europe
The Liberal idea of Europe has won the argument decisively, indeed to such a degree that it has set off a reactionary debate. This is best epitomised by the current dialectic on the idea of Europe within French socialism, but by no means confined exclusively to that party. Many societies have failed adequately to develop models to dynamise their own political, economic and social prospects in an increasingly global age.

In the enlarged and diverse European Union of today the export from the national to the European stage of failed and second-best policies and politics not surprisingly was seen through and rejected as a non-runner. The reactionaries now chose to blame the contemporary idea of Europe and not themselves for their own inadequacies. This externalisation of blame for perceived failures is a threat from within whose expression and scale remains to be tested and measured.

A second and more insidious threat to the Liberal idea of Europe has already expressed itself with deadly effect. If the bridge in Sarajevo in 1914 marked the beginning of the 20th century, no doubt the attacks on the United States on the 11th September 2001 heralded the arrival of the 21 th century, an age of new uncertainty. Both from without and within Europe is touched by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its associated islamo-fascist brutality.

The murders of the 11th March last on the early trains in Madrid and the recent killing of the Dutch film producer Theo van Gogh are stork reminders of these new uncertainties. Traditionally, our Liberal discourse emphasises rights, respect, responsibility, tolerance and pluralismo The rights paradigm is seen as both individual and universal. We are less clear on how to deal with groups and whether, if and how they can express group identity without offending our liberal universalism and without yielding to a new tribalism.

The idea of Europe needs to pose these questions and answer these challenges. But one answer is beyond dispute. We must be tough-minded enough to recognise that we have no liberal, democratic or universalist contract with those, a minority, a small minority, who would use our basic freedoms as a cover for subversively destroying and attacking our democracies from within. Liberal democracy and the principles of universal rights require of us a deep and pluralist tolerance for "the other" but not at the price of risking " the self ". What is worth believing in is also worth defending.

These challenges are not isolated, not exclusive to any one member state of the Union and therefore are amenable to make common European cause in our response. Freedom is wider and deeper in Europe now than before. Let us resolve to keep it that way.

* Mr. Cox (Dublin, 1952) is a highly respected Liberal, member of Ireland´s Progressive Democrats / Extracted from Liberal Aerogramme, December 2004 issue / February 9, 2004
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