An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies University of Miami

 

Staff Report

    Recent events and policies all tend to indicate that Fidel Castro seeks to radicalize Cuban politics and society as his legacy to loyalists and opponents alike. Reminiscent of a senescent China's Mao in his quest for ideological revival, Castro has embarked on his own Cultural Revolution. In the twilight of his nearly half-century rule over an exhausted and increasingly disaffected people, Castro has launched a multifaceted and ever-expanding campaign -- heralded as the Battle of Ideas -- aimed at reviving the waning faith of his comrades in the Cuban revolution, crushing any would-be dissent, and attempting to ensure the political and ideological continuity of his regime beyond his death.

Ideology

 Social Workers: Over 30,000 youth (typically those who had discontinued their studies, were chronically unemployed, or hailed from the poorest, and presumably most loyal, provinces) have been recruited and trained as social workers and assigned to high-profile anti-corruption crusades. Young social workers have replaced state employees at gas stations and commissioned to guard the islands energy infrastructure. Like Mao with his Red Guards, Castro has publicly conferred his authority on these brigades of social workers, who now possess extralegal powers to monitor, interrogate, and accuse state employees suspected of pilfering. (1)

 New Rich: Castro has publicly assailed the so-called new rich of post-Soviet Cuban society (e.g., clandestine entrepreneurs who run home-based restaurants colloquially termed paladares, or anyone who receives hard currency from relatives abroad). In a November 2005 speech Castro made it clear that anything smacking of capitalism would not have a future in Cuba: The empire [U.S.] was hoping that Cuba would have many more paladares, but it appears that there will be no more of them. What do they think that we have become, neo-liberals? No one here has become a neo-liberal.(2) Consequently, what little individual enterprise is legally tolerated by the regime is now being driven out of business, burdened with high utility surcharges and onerous taxes. (3)

Repression

 Political Prisoners: In 2003, the regime conducted an island-wide sweep of dissident organizations and summarily sentenced 75 peaceful critics to long prison terms. More than 330 individuals have been identified as legitimate prisoners of conscience by the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, including 57 arrested in 2005 alone. (3) Many more languish in Cuban jails under trumped-up charges.

 State-Sponsored Brutality: Dissidents and civil rights activists face relentless acts of verbal and physical harassment  known as acts of repudiation -- sanctioned by the regime. State security operatives dressed as civilians routinely assault and batter regime opponents in virtually every neighborhood in the island. (4)

 Culture of Violence: Cuban prisons currently house approximately 100,000 inmates, with as many as 200,000 estimated by the United Nations, the highest per capita figure in the world. Most inmates tend to be from the most hard-pressed and disaffected sectors of society: young, poor, and Afro-Cuban. (5)

_________________________________________________     

Notes

1. Cf. Anthony Boadle, "Cuba begins to prepare for post-Castro era," Reuters, Havana, 19 January 2006.

2. Cf. Fidel Castro, speech given at the University of Havana, November 17, 2005, http://www.granma.cu/documento/ingles05/17nov.html. See also Vanessa Arrington, "Gov't Drive Vs. 'Rich" Hits Average Cubans," Havana, Associated Press, February 4, 2006.

3. Cf. Patricia Grogg, "Mas presos por motivos politicos en 2005," Havana, IPS, 11 January 2006, http://www.ipsnoticias.net/nota.asp?idnews=36305.

4. Reuters, "Cuban dissidents targeted more by mobs," Havana, February 9, 2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N09331005.htm.

5. Cf. Nancy San Martin, "Cuba's many prisons may hold 100,000", The Miami Herald, 22 September 2003, http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y03/sep03/22e4.htm.

_________________________________________________